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THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD-
DECISIONS OF ITS FIRST YEAR*
LEoN M. DEsPREs AND MEYER J. MYERt
INCE the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act' on
July 5, 1935, the National Labor Relations Board appointed pur-
suant to Sec. 3 (a) has rendered more than one hundred decisions.
The constitutionality of the act has been submitted to the Supreme Court
for decision2 and may soon be determined; but even if the act is held in-
valid, the body of decisions handed down by the Board is an important
source of precedent and experience for possible future administrative and
legislative action. This comment will not discuss the constitutionality of
the act (treated elsewhere in this issueS), the right of employers to restrain
administrative hearings by the Board, or the problems attending enforce-
ment of the Board's orders. It is proposed to discuss here the Board's
substantive interpretation of the act insofar as it appears from the Board's
decisions.4
The public policy expressed in section i favors collective bargaining
of employees with their employer over individual bargaining which has
heretofore generally been protected by law.5 Section 7 declares the em-
ployees' right to organize and "to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing." The unfair labor practices defined in
section 8 and the procedure for determining representatives provided in
section 9 are all designed to implement the right and to enforce a correla-
tive duty upon the employer. The main problems of the Board have been:
(i) to determine in each case whether interstate commerce has been af-
* Decisions of the Board are cited herein by the Board's case number and decision number.
Information has been received that the Board is contemplating the early publication of its
first annual report which will contain the text of its decisions to date. This comment includes
the Board's decisions to and including Dec. io5, issued Oct. 2, 1936.
t Members of the Illinois Bar.
149 Stat. 452 (1935); 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 157-166 (I935).
2 C.C.H. Labor Law Serv. T 16,ooo (1936). 3 See p. io9 post.
4 For a discussion of the decisions of the former National Labor Relations Board, see 48
Harv. L. Rev. 630 (1935).
s Hitchman Coal Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 250 (1917); Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161 (igo8); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. z (1915).
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fected; (2) to define the nature of collective bargaining, fix the appropriate
bargaining unit, and ascertain the representatives of the majority;s (3)
to construe (a) "discrimination" in regard to hire or tenure, (b) dominat-
ing and fostering of company unions, and (c) interference, restraint, or
coercion by an employer generally.
INTERSTATE COMIDERCE
In no decision has the Board failed to find that the case before it af-
fected interstate commerce within the meaning of section i and section 2.
The Board seems to have taken the position that in the present complex
and interrelated business structure of this country, the free flow of trade
and traffic across state lines is affected by the labor relations of businesses
purchasing or selling substantial quantities of goods in other states; how-
ever, this position does not seem to be supported by the ruling in Carter v.
Carter Coal Company.6 It has filled its decisions with exhaustive findings
stressing the effect of industrial unrest on the free flow of commerce
among the states; and it has emphasized every conceivable fact showing
the interrelationship of the activities of the business in question with
enterprises in other states and with the movement of goods across state
lines.
The Board is on firmest ground in the few cases involving interstate
transportation and communication.' Closely related are cases involving
dock workers,8 garage mechanics servicing interstate buses,9 employees
who repair ocean-going fishing boats, ° and employees who are engaged in
sa For a discussion of the treatment of similar problems under the Railway Labor Act, 44
Stat 577 (1927); 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-63 (1928), see First Annual Report of National Mediation
Board 1-24 (1935).
6 56 S. Ct. 855 (1936). Since the rendering of this decision the Board has practically dis-
continued the issuance of complaints in cases relating to ordinary mining and manufacturing
enterprises.
Bus operators: In re Washington Coach Co., C. 63, Dec. 68, order held enforceable
(C.C.A. 4 th October 6, 1936), C.C.H. Labor Law Serv. I 16315 (1936), cert. granted, Oct. 26,
1936; motor transport lines: In re Protective Motor Service Co., C. 25, Dec. 52; In re Clifford
M. DeKay, C. 112, Dec. 102; steamship lines: In re Internat'l Mercantile Marine Co., R. 24,
Dec. 34; In re Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., C. 36-38, Dec. 90; In re Luckenbach Steamship
Co., R. 41, Dec. 1oo; In re Black Diamond Steamship Corp., R. 107, Dec. io3; ferry between
two states: It re Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co., IV. C. 2, Dec. 6; news service: In re As-
sociated Press, R. 26, Dec. 58 and 67, 85 F. (2d) 56 (C.C.A. 2d 1936) cert. granted, Oct. 26,
1936; telegrams and radiograms: In re Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co., C. 16, Dec. 17.
8 In re Agwilines, Inc., C. 103, Dec. 83.
9 In re Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., C. i, Dec. i; In re New England Transporta-
tion Co., I. R. 2, Dec. 8.
"oIn re Harbor Boatbuilding Co., C. 45, Dec. 26.
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the business of assembling packages for railroad shipment to other
states.""
In re St. Joseph Stockyards CompanyT2 deals with an employer operat-
ing a stockyard similar in almost every respect to the stockyard in Staf-
ford v. Wallace'3 in which the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 was
upheld. The identical stockyard was involved in St. Joseph Stockyards
Company v. United States, 4 upholding the right of the Secretary of Agri-
culture to fix maximum rates. Both of these cases held that interstate
commerce was affected and afford a strong basis for the Board's jurisdic-
tion, unless a court should differentiate them on the ground that the
employer-employee relationship does not have a similar bearing on inter-
state commerce.
The overwhelming majority of the cases which have come before the
Board involve manufacturing and mining enterprises. In some, the opera-
tions themselves are carried on across state lines.Y In justifying its juris-
diction in other cases, the Board has emphasized the nationwide char-
acter of certain enterprises where the employees of one or two branch
plants have been involved. Such are the large steel companies, owning
mines, mills, fabricating plants, boat and barge lines, railroads, ware-
houses, and sales offices in many states, with the product of the enter-
prise moving repeatedly across state lines from the beginning of its
fabrication to its final disposition. 6 So-called partial fabrication cases
introduce an additional element on which the Board has relied. Such is
the manufacture of unfinished hosiery,"7 unfinished cloth and yam,5 and
unfinished metal parts and supplies.19 The unfinished product in each case
is shipped across state lines for further fabrication into a finished product
which is often in turn moved across state lines. The Board has relied
upon Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering-° and Aeolian Co. v. Fischer,2
11 In re Nat'l New York Packing and Shipping Co., C. 83, Dec. 84 (order held enforcible,
C.C.A. 2d, Nov. 2, 1936).
- C. 43, Dec. 87. 13 258 U.S. 495 (1922). '4 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
IS In re Bell Oil and Gas Co., C. 48, Dec. 44 (an oil pressure system with pipe lines across a
state boundary); In re Pioneer Pearl Button Co., C. 64, Dec. 69.
6 In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., C. 57, Dec. 43; but see N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 83 F. (2d) 998 (C.C.A. 5th 1936) (held not interstate commerce); In re Chrysler
Corp., R. 16, Dec. ro (automobile plant); In re Aluminum Co. of America, R. 4, Dec. 41; In re
Samson Tire and Rubber Corp., R. 34, Dec. 98a.
7 In re Blood & Co., R. 20, Dec. 29.
18 In re Gate City Cotton Mills, X.R. i, Dec. 2; In re Dwight Mfg. Co., R. 9, Dec. 23.
X9 In re Internat'l Nickel Co., R. 3o, Dec. 59. "0 254 U.S. 443 (192r).
213s F. (2d) 34 (D.C. N.Y. 1929), 40 F. (2d) i89 (C.C.A. 2d 1930).
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in which conspiracies to obstruct the installation of printing presses and
organs respectively were held to affect interstate commerce, to sustain its
jurisdiction in In re Timken Silent Automatic Company,22 where employees
installed'and serviced oil burners transported from another state.
In the great bulk of cases, however, the Board has dealt with typical
mining and manufacturing enterprises.3 It has emphasized the quantity
of goods purchased and sold in other states, and in addition it has laid
stress on numerous additional factors, such as: nationwide advertising
of the employer's product ;24 existence of railroad spurs or sidings at a
factory and engagement of employees in loading or unloading railroad
cars;25 existence of teletype communication with a plant in another state ;26
ownership or leasing of warehouse space in another state;27 purchases
f.o.b. shipping point and payment of inbound freight charges;2 8 fabrica-
tion pursuant to special order for a plant in another state.29 It seems
doubtful, however, that these additional factors will be sufficient to sus-
tain the Board's jurisdiction in these cases.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The duty to "bargain collectively in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment" is referred to
as "that long-observed process whereby negotiations are conducted for
the purpose of arriving at collective agreements governing terms of em-
ployment for some specified period. ' ' 3° In line with the expressed purposes
of the act favoring collective bargaining, the Board has placed the highest
duty upon the employer to bargain and negotiate. A mere meeting with
the representatives or a mere consideration of grievances is not enough;
3X
nor is mere willingness to meet sufficient where the employer announces
in advance that he will never execute an agreement. The employer must
C. IO, Dec. 25.
23 In re Fruehauf Trailer Co., C. 2, Dec. 4; id. 85 F. (2d) 391 (C.C.A. 6th 1936), holding
interstate commerce is not involved.
24 In re Nat'l Casket Co., C. ii, Dec. 81.
25 In re Columbia Radiator Co., C. 66, Dec. 7i; In re R.C.A. Mfg. Co., R. 39, Dec. 97.
2In re Internat'l Nickel Co., R. 30, Dec. 59.
27 In re Vegetable Oil Products Co., C. 44, Dec. 82.
28 In re Dwight Mfg. Co., R. 9, Dec. 23.
29 In re Oregon Worsted Co., C. 65, Dec. 76.
3o In re St. Joseph Stock Yards Co., C. 43, Dec. 87.
31 In re Timken Silent Automatic Co., C. io, Dec. 25; In re Canton Enameling & Stamping
Co., C. 47, Dec. 31.
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submit counter-proposals if the union's proposals are unsatisfactory to
him.32 The Board has said:
It is hardly necessary to state that from the duty of the employer to bargain col-
lectively with his employees there does not flow any duty on the part of the employer
to accede to the demands of the employees. However, before the obligation to bar-
gain collectively is fulfilled, a forthright, candid effort must be made by the employer
to reach a settlement of the dispute with his employees. Every avenue and possi-
bility of negotiation must be exhausted before it should be admitted that an irrecon-
cilable difference creating an impasse has been reached.33
And even after the reaching of an impasse, any change in the situa-
tion, such as the arrival of a federal conciliator or the calling of a strike-
4
has been held to be such a change as to require a resumption of nego-
tiations. Even after the union calls a strike to enforce its demands, the
employer's duty to bargain collectively is not necessarily terminated,
and it is immaterial that the strike may have been undemocratically
called35 Nor may the employer refuse to bargain collectively on the
ground that the union's demands are so great that he will not meet them.
Thus the union may demand a closed shop 36 or a change in management 37
and the duty to bargain collectively still remains. If the union had de-
manded, for example, not merely a change of management but a transfer
of the ownership of the assets of the business or a substantial change in
business policy not related to labor relations, would the Board have
reached the same result? Perhaps the test is whether the union's demands
have a sufficiently reasonable basis to characterize them as having been
made in good faith with a view to entering into bargaining negotiations.
These decisions seem clearly in accordance with the underlying pur-
pose of Congress in granting unions legal protection and fortification of
their right to bargain collectively. A union which is unable even to induce
the employer to enter into bargaining negotiations must perforce be
economically weak, and will usually disintegrate following repeated
failures. A strong union can by its own economic strength compel the
employer not only to negotiate with it but to grant substantial concessions
in wages, hours, or working conditions. It is therefore the weak union
32 In re Edward E. Cox, Printer, C. 37, Dec. 45.
33 I; re Sands Mfg. Co., C. 33, Dec. 46.
34 In re Jeffrey-Dewitt.Insulator Co., C. 21, Dec. 5o.
3slin re Consumers' Research, Inc., C. 52, Dec. 85; cf. In re Bell Oil and Gas Co., C. 48,
Dec. 44; In re Alaska Juneau Co., C. 91, Dec. 94.
36 In re Intemat'l Filter Co., C. 56 and R. 21, Dec. 40; In re Alaska Juneau Co., C. 91, Dec.
94.
37 In re Consumers' Research, Inc., C. 52, Dec. 85.
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which needs the legal assistance of the act to grow and become effective
in advancing the interests of its members. However, the implementation
granted by the act is limited to the imposition of a duty on the employer
to bargain. The concessions in wages, hours, or working conditions, which
are the real objects of union organization and which preserve and foster
the union's growth, can still be obtained only by the union's own strength.
Thus, although it appears on the surface that the Board's decisions pro-
vide the union with an effective instrument for obtaining concessions,
nevertheless the real economic advantages obtained from the Board's
interpretation of the act are much less efficient.
BARGAINIG UNIT
The Board has held that the union or other bargaining agency must
represent a majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit
before the employer will be compelled to bargain collectively.38 Repre-
sentation is determined not by membership alone, but may be proved by
the execution of powers of attorney39 or by enrollment on a strike benefit
list.4° Where the union has at one time been, but because of the em-
ployer's anti-union activities has ceased being, the representative of the
majority, it has been held that the employer must still bargain collectively
with the union as the exclusive representative.41 This simply represents an
application of the maxim that none shall profit by his own wrong.
Section 9 (b) directs the Board to determine the unit, be it the "em-
ployer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." The problem
of determining the appropriate bargaining unit is of course of the greatest
importance. For example, a union organized on craft or semi-craft lines
may have a majority in only one division of a plant, and the organization
of that division can be preserved, let us say, against a plant-wide company
union, only by a holding that the division constitutes the appropriate bar-
gaining unit.
In its determinations of appropriate bargaining units the Board has
tacitly given prime consideration to the rules of the interested existing
bona fide labor organizations governing eligibility to membership as to
tasks performed. Wherever there has been a conflict between a bona fide
labor organization and an employer, or between a bona fide labor organ-
ization and a labor organization which the Board suspects of being a com-
39 In re Segall-Maigen, Inc., C. 35, Dec. 65; In re Alaska Juneau Co., C. 9i, Dec. 94.
39 "I re St. Joseph Stock Yards Co., C. 43, Dec. 87.
4o In re Rabor Co., C. 29, Dec. 37.
4r In re Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., C. I4, Dec. I4; In re Segall-Maigen, Inc.,
C. 35, Dec. 65; In re Alaska Juneau Co., C. 9i, Dec. 94.
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pany union, the Board has always decided in favor of the bargaining unit
supported by the bona fide labor organization. In cases of conflict be-
tween two bona fide labor organizations both of which form a part of the
American Federation of Labor, the Board has declined to pass on the
question of a bargaining unit, saying that the two unions should have re-
course to their parent organization for a decision on the conflict of juris-
diction.42 A more difficult problem which may present itself in connection
with the drive for industrial unions would require the Board to choose
between the industrial form of organization and the craft form, without
being able to send the problem back to a common parent organization for
decision.
Where employees have expressed a desire to organize along narrower
than plant lines, the Board has usually recognized the criteria established
by the employees themselves, and has assigned in addition reasons such
as the following: a higher or at least a different degree of skill is required;43
rates of pay and working conditions are different; 44 the employees con-
stitute a "homogeneous and distinct" group;45 the employees in other
departments have expressed no desire for representation or organiza-
tion;46 and the employer has recognized the appropriateness of the re-
quested unit in the past.47
ELECTIONS
The duty of the employer to bargain collectively raises the additional
problem of determining who are the representatives of the majority. Sec-
tion 9(c) provides a method by which the Board may determine and
certify in advance the representatives of a majority, and for this purpose
may order an election by secret ballot. This procedure is entirely separate
from a proceeding by the Board charging a violation of section 8(5) for
refusal to bargain collectively.
Where the Board conducts a hearing and finds from the evidence pre-
sented that a certain union or group has already been designated by the
majority, the Board will certify the representatives without the holding
42 In re Aluminum Co. of America, R. 4, Dec. 41; In re Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co., R. 5,
Dec. 48; In re Standard Oil Co. of California, XX. R. 3, Dec. 49.
43 In re Internatl Mercantile Marine Co., R. 24, Dec. 34; In re Internat'l Filter Co., C. 56
and R. 21, Dec. 4o; In re Edward E. Cox, Printer, C. 37, Dec. 45.
44 In re Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co., IV. C. 2, Dec. 6; In re Canton Enameling &
Stamping Co., C. 47, Dec. 31; In re R.C.A. Mfg. Co. R. 39, Dec. 97.
4s It re Intemat'l Filter Co., C. 56 and R. 21, Dec. 40.
46 In re Internat'l Filter Co., C. s6 and R. 2r, Dec. 40; In re American Tobacco Co., R. 32,
Dec. 99.
47 In re Bell Oil & Gas Co., C. 48, Dec. 44; In re Edward E. Cox, Printer, C. 37, Dec. 45.
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of an election. 45 But in cases where the evidence does not clearly disclose
whether representatives have been designated by a majority, i.e., where
the employer questions the union representation,49 where there are con-
flicting claims of two organizations not both members of the American
Federation of Labor,5° or where all parties consent to the holding of an
election, sy a secret election will be ordered.
In the holding of an election, the Board has ruled that a majority of the
employees eligible to vote must participate5 2 but that only a majority of
the votes cast is necessary for designation. S3
INTERFERENCE, RESTRAINT AND COERCION
To insure collective bargaining and to permit employees to organize
in furtherance of the purposes set forth in section i, it is essential that
the employees be free to associate themselves in bona fide labor organ-
izations. To this end, section 8(1) has made it an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the
exercise of their right to organization and collective bargaining as set
forth in section 7.
A. DISCRIMNATION
The form of interference most often found in practice and in the
decisions of the Board is "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of em-
ployment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization," which is made an unfair
labor practice by section 8(3). The Board's problem in this connection
is twofold: (i) to determine whether the acts complained of have the
effect of discrimination; (2) to determine whether the employer's motive
was to discourage union activity and membership.
The Board has held discrimination to include discharge, s4 failure to re-
instate or rehire,55 temporary lay-off,s6 and preference in assignment of
48 In re Blood & Co., R. 2o, Dec. 29; but see In re Dwight Mfg. Co., R. 9, Dec. 23.
49 In re Gate City Cotton Mills, X.R. i, Dec. 2; In re Belmont Stamping & Enameling
Co., R. 23, De&. 3o and 57; In re Associated Press, R. 26, Dec. 58 and C. 84, Dec. 67.
soIn re Wayne Knitting Mills, Inc., R. 2, Dec. 3; In re Bendix Products Corp., R. 8, Dec.
20; In re Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., R. 36, R. 37, R. 38, Dec. go.
s In re Baer Co., C. 8, Dec. 9.
51 In re Chrysler Corp., R. 16, Dec. io, 63.
53In re Associated Press, R. 26, Dec. 58 and C. 84, Dec. 67, citing Virginia Ry. Co. v.
System Federation No. 40, 84 F. (2d) 641 (C.C.A. 4 th 1936), cert. granted, C.C.H. Labor
Law Serv. I6,ooo (1936).
S4 In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., C. 57, Dec. 43, 83 F. (2d) 998 (C.C.A. 5th 1936).
ss In re Clinton Cotton Mills, C. 5, Dec. 5; In re Columbia Radiator Co., C. 66, Dec. 71.
s
6 In re Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., C. i, Dec. r.
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jobs. 57 Failure to reinstate or rehire extends to employees whose work has
ceased as a consequence of or in connection with any current labor dispute
or any unfair labor practice as defined in section 2(3). In this connection
the Board has construed labor disputes to be "current" which have lasted
from three months to a year.s5 The test of currency seems to be whether
there is still a possibility of settlement.
There may be discrimination in "hiring," the Board has held, even
though the discriminatory failure to hire is directed against a person who
is not an employee. 9
The factual problem of determining the employer's motive is much
more difficult, as are all inquiries into a mental state. It may be said that
after proof has been made of a discharge following union activity, es-
pecially where the employer has a record of hostility toward the union,
the Board has placed the burden upon the employer to prove absence of
unlawful motive °.6 This may be due not only to the difficulty of proving
the employer's state of mind where the employer can with relative ease
cover up proof of his motive, as years of experience with anti-blacklisting
statutes have demonstrated, 6' but also to the Board's desire to eliminate
obstacles to the accomplishment of the purposes announced in the act.
In a majority of cases, the employer has attempted to justify his act on
grounds of inefficiency; and in such cases the Board has required the
employer to produce clear proof that inefficiency was the sole reason for
his conduct.62 Even though an employee may have been inefficient, never-
theless if he would have been retained but for his union activity, the
Board has found against the employer.63 In a case where a non-union
employee was discharged, the Board found a violation where the em-
ployer was motivated by an erroneous belief that the employee was a
member of the union 4 or was engaged in organizing a union among his
employees.1
From a reading of the decisions it might appear that the Board's rulings
in these cases have not been in accordance with traditional rules of law
s7In re Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., C. i6, Dec. i7.
s8ln re Carlisle Lumber Co., C. 93, Dec. io4; In re Beaver Mills, R. 12, Dec. 12; In re
Alabama Mills, C. 76, Dec. 86.
s9 In re Algonquin Printing Co., C. 7, Dec. 21.
6
o In re United Aircraft Mfg. Corp., C. 31, Dec. 18.
6, Witte, The Government in Labor Disputes 213-18 (1932).
62 In re United Aircraft Mfg. Corp., C. 3i, Dec. i8; In re Columbia Radiator Co., C. 66,
Dec. 71.
63 In re Nat'l New York Packing & Shipping Co., C. 83, Dec. 84.
64 In re Fashion Piece Dye Works, C. 22, Dec. 19.
6 In re Pusey, Maynes & Breish Co., C. 28, Dec. 38.
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or with the facts proved; nevertheless it can probably be safely said that
the Board's conclusions are founded on the realities of the situation and
are designed to promote the expressed purposes of the act.
B. COMPANY UNIONS
Another common type of interference is the promotion of the company
union, which the act has proscribed in section 8(2) by declaring it to be
an unfair labor practice for an employer to "dominate or interfere with
the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute
financial or other support to it." Freedom of association and the concept
of collective bargaining are decidedly limited when the association is
dominated by the very employer with whom it is proposed to deal at arm's
length. It is difficult to destroy the influence of the company union when
the company union has the paternal recognition and support of the em-
ployer; thus the Board has employed three methods which have the
effect of combating it: (i) defining the appropriate bargaining unit so as
to liquidate the company union's voting strength; (2) specifically finding
a violation of section 8(2); (3) where the serious practical difficulty of ob-
taining evidence prevents a finding of violation of section 8(2), finding a
violation of section 8(I) based on the same facts which were unsuccess-
fully presented in an effort to establish a violation of section 8(2).66
An unsuccessful attempt to encourage or dominate a labor organization
has been held as much a violation as a successful attempt.6 7
C. OTHER INTERFERENCE
Wherever the Board has found the existence of an unfair labor practice
involving a company union (section 8(2)) or discrimination (section
8(3)), by definition it has found an "interference, restraint, or coercion"
under section 8(1). There are however other acts constituting interference
under section 8(1) which can not be classified under section 8(2) or section
8(3). Such are open surveillance of union meetings and urging employees
not to form a union;"8 employment of detectives to spy on employees en-
gaged in union organization;69 acts in the nature of unlawful discrimina-
tion which do not support a finding of violation of section 8(3) ;70 a refusal
to bargain collectively with a labor organization even though there has
been no showing that the organization represents a majority of the em-
ployees, but where no other organization represents a majority;711 and by
influence on a Citizens' Committee, town businessmen, and police, causing
6In re Atlanta Woolen Mills, C. I3, Dec. 24, Dec. 75.
67 In re Canvas Glove Mfg. Works, C. 24, Dec. 42.
68 In re Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., C. i, Dec. i.
69 In re Fashion Piece Dye Works, C. 22, Dec. 1g.
70In re Greensboro Lumber Co., C. 17, Dec. 51.
7' In re Alaska Juneau Co., C. 9i, Dec. 94.
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economic discrimination against union members and internal disruption
of the union.72 The variety of acts of interference depends only upon the
ingenuity of a hostile employer, and the Board has been quick to brand
them as unfair labor practices.
PROCEDURE
A. EVIDENCE
Section io(b) provides that rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law
or equity shall not be controlling before the Board. The courts have how-
ever announced certain broad rules relating to the admission and exclusion
of evidence before administrative bodies, such as the Federal Trade Com-
mission7 3 and the Board will no doubt be bound by these rulings.
Certain problems of evidence have presented themselves for decision
which are in a measure peculiar to the problems of the Board. Employers
have objected that it is improper for the Board to consider evidence of any
acts which occurred before July 5, 1935, the effective date of the act. But
the Board has held that such evidence is admissible as proof of motive
and intent after that date.74
It has excluded evidence of communist sympathy on the part of the
employees and communist affiliation of a union, particularly where
the evidence showed that the employer retained employees solely on
the basis of ability to perform their tasks.75 The Board has likewise re-
jected evidence of a union's acts of violence and the employees' hostility
toward the employer and toward strikebreakers,7 6 on the theory that had
the employer complied with the act, such activity would have been
averted.
In order to protect employees from unfair labor practices which might
follow, the Board has consistently permitted the introduction in evidence
of union cards or lists to prove the union's majority without requiring
that they be disclosed to the employer or his counsel.7 7 This accords with
the practice of the Federal Trade Commission which declines to release
the names of persons filing complaints.75
72 In re Brown Shoe Co., Inc., C. 20, Dec. 66.
73 Bene v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 299 Fed. 468 (C.C.A. 2d I924); Federal Trade Comm'n
v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52 (1927).
74 In re Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., C. i, Dec. i.
7s Cf. Judgment of the L. Arb. G., Frankfurt-am-Main of November 27, 1933, Arb.R.
Samml., Vol. XIX, LAG., p. 207; International Survey of Legal Decisions on Labour Law,
1933, P. 151 (1935).
76In re Consumers' Research, Inc., C. 52, Dec. 8s; In re Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,
C. i6, Dec. 17.
77In re Internat'l Mercantile Marine, R. 24, Dec. 34; In re Samson Tire & Rubber Corp.,
R. 34, Dec. 98.
78 Henderson, Federal Trade Commission 65 (1924).
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B. RELIEF
Typical relief afforded in cases other than petitions for certification is
an order, usually couched in the words of the statute, directing the em-
ployer to cease the particular unfair labor practice or practices of which
he has been found guilty. Under the authority of section io(c) permitting
the Board to "take such affibnative action .... as will effectuate the
policies" of the act, the Board has issued specific directions to the em-
ployer. It has ordered the employer to bargain collectively with the
designated representatives. In discrimination cases, it has ordered the
reinstatement of discharged employees, usually with back pay from the
date of discharge to the date of reinstatement, less the employee's earn-
ings in the interval. But where the employees have struck following or
concurrently with the employer's refusal to bargain collectively, reinstate-
ment will usually be ordered without back pay.79 Where a trial examiner
issued an intermediate report finding the discharge not to have been dis-
criminatory, no back pay was ordered for the period between the inter-
mediate report and the Board's' order for reinstatement. 8o In cases in-
volving a company union, the Board has not merely ordered the cessation
of unfair labor practices, but has affirmatively ordered the employer to
withdraw recognition. 8' It has also ordered an employer to reduce to a
written and binding memorandum the terms upon which agreement was
reached during negotiations with the union. 82 Throughout all its orders
it has been the purpose of the Board to place the parties in the position
they would have occupied had the employer not committed the unfair
labor practice.
For an understanding of the decisions of the Board, one must bear
in mind the postulate upon which the Board has stated the act to be
based:
That union organization is the exclusive concern of labor; that employees may ad-
vance that objective in any legitimate and orderly manner; and that they are entitled
to the protection of the Board if the employer interfers with or coerces them in the
exercise of their right to organize are elementary principles of the legislation under
which this Board is constituted.83
79In re Cleveland Chair Co., C. 18, Dec. 74.
so In re E. R. Haffelfinger Co., C. 46, Dec. 64; In re Mann Edge Tool Co., C. 61, Dec. 8o.
8 In re Atlanta Woolen Mills, C. 13, Dec. 24 and 75.
82 In re St. Joseph Stock Yards Co., C. 43, Dec. 87.
83 In re Protective Motor Service Co., C. 25, Dec. 52; cf. Texas and N. 0. R. Co. v. Brother-
hood, 281 U.S. 548, 571 (1930).
